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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

held that a claimant who is justifiably demoted and subsequently
terminates his employment is not entitled to receive unemployment
compensation.
Valley School v. Pennsylvania
Allegheny
Compensation Bd., 697 A.2d. 243 (Pa. 1997).

Unemployment

Section 802(b) of Pennsylvania's unemployment compensation
law1 prohibits the granting of benefits to anyone who voluntarily
terminates his employment without a "necessitous and compelling
reason. " 2 The legislature enacted section 802(b) to provide
economic security to those persons unemployed through no fault of
3
their own.
On January 13, 1992, Darrell Callwood ("Callwood") began
working for Allegheny Valley School ("Allegheny Valley") as an
assistant house manager.4 Early in his employment, management
notified Callwood of deficiencies in his performance. 5 He was
subsequently demoted from his position as assistant house manager6
and offered two alternate positions within Allegheny Valley.
1. 43 PA- CONS. STAT. ANN. § 802(b) (1991 & West Supp. 1998). Section 802(b) provides,
in pertinent part, "an employee shall be ineligible for compensation in any week -...
(b) In which his unemployment is due to voluntarily leaving work without cause of a
necessitous and compelling nature." Id.
2. Allegheny Valley School v. Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Bd., 697 A.2d.
243, 248 (Pa 1997). A "necessitous and compelling" cause is one which results from
circumstances which produce pressure to terminate employment that is both real and
substantial, which would compel a reasonable person under the circumstances to act in the
same manner. Taylor v. Unemployment Compensation Bd., 378 A.2d 829 (Pa 1977).
3. Allegheny Valley, 697 A.2d at 247-48. The court recognized that economic insecurity
is a serious menace to the general welfare of the Commonwealth. Therefore, the purpose of
section 802 is to alleviate economic pressure and provide economic reassurance to those
who are involuntarily unemployed or are idle through no fault of their own. Id.
4. Id. at 245. Allegheny Valley is an institution that provides for the care and education
of developmentally disabled individuals. Id.
5. Id. The supervisors' complaints concerning Callwood's work performance included
Callwood's failure to follow established routines, his inability to deal effectively with staff,
his failure to use good judgment in his work, his deficiency in reporting information in a
timely manner, and his inability to carry out his job responsibilities in a consistent and
professional manner. Id.
6. Id. The alternate positions offered Caliwood by Allegheny Valley were house
manager aide or developmental care specialist. Both positions required Callwood to accept a
reduction in salary of approximately $4,000 per year. Id.
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Caliwood refused both offers, terminated his employment, and filed
for unemployment compensation benefits with the Office of
7
Employment Security ("OES").
Allegheny Valley appealed OES' grant of benefits and the appeal
was assigned to an unemployment compensation referee who
affirmed the OES decision.8 Allegheny Valley appealed the referee's
decision to the Unemployment Compensation Review Board
("Board"), which again affirmed.9 Next, Allegheny Valley appealed
the Board's decision to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania,
which held that when a claimant's demotion is justified due to poor
performance, the claimant may still receive benefits if he can show
that he made a good faith effort to perform his job, or that his
conduct did not rise to "willful misconduct." 0 The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania granted allocatur to establish the factors that must
be considered in determining whether a claimant had a necessitous
and compelling reason for terminating his employment." The court
found that the facts did not support a finding that Callwood had a
12
necessitous and compelling reason.
A majority of the court recognized that voluntary termination of
employment is not a complete bar to receiving unemployment
compensation if one can show a necessitous and compelling reason
for the termination. 3 The court, however, rejected the argument
7. Id.
8. Allegheny Valley, 697 A.2d at 246. Both the Office of Employment Security and the
referee concluded that Callwood's demotion and reduction in pay were necessitous and
compelling reasons, thereby justifying voluntary termination. Id.
9. Id. The Board concluded that Callwood had worked to the best of his ability and
the demotion and reduction in pay were unreasonable and unjustified. Id.
10. Id. In determining whether Callwood was entitled to benefits, the court applied a
two-part test. First, the court must determine if the reason for demotion was unjustified, and
if the answer is yes, no further inquiry is required, and the claimant is entitled to benefits. If
the demotion was justified, the factfinder must determine whether the changes in the terms
and conditions of employment were reasonably related to the reasons for demotion (citing
Old Forge Bank v. Unemployment Compensation Bd., 666 A.2d 761 (Pa. 1995)).
11. Id. "Allocatur" is the allowance of a writ or order. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 49 (6th
ed. 1991).
12. Id. (citing Zerbe v. Unemployment Compensation Bd., 681 A.2d 740 (Pa. 1996)). In
Zerbe, the cort noted that the scope of review from an appeal of an adjudication of the
Board is limited to determining whether a constitutional right has been violated, whether an
error of law has been committed, or whether there is substantial evidence to support factual
findings. Id.

13. Allegheny Valley, 697 A.2d at 248 (citing Taylor v. Unemployment Compensation
Bd., 378 A.2d 829 (Pa. 1977)). In Taylor, the supreme court held that a necessitous and
compelling reason for termination of employment existed when "the pressure of real not
imaginary, substantial, not trifling, reasonable not whimsical, circumstances compel the
decision to leave employment." Id. at 832-33. The court reasoned that, in such circumstances,
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that even if an employer were justified in demoting an employee,
the employee may still be entitled to unemployment
compensation. 14 The court reasoned that a person should not reap
unemployment benefits if the termination of his or her employment
arose through his or her own fault. 15 In addition, the court noted
that forcing an investigation of factors other than the justification
of demotion would have a chilling effect on an employer's right to
maintain competent workers. 16 Therefore, since Callwood had a
history of poor job performance, the supreme court held that his
demotion was justified and reversed the order granting him
17
unemployment benefits.
Justice Cappy dissented from the majority's application of section
8
802(b) of Pennsylvania's unemployment compensation law.'
Specifically, the dissent found that the majority's decision to
consider only the justification of demotion before granting benefits
was inconsistent with Pennsylvania's unemployment compensation
law.19 Moreover, Justice Cappy stated that the new test
promulgated by the majority did not give deference to various
circumstances, other than demotion, which may require a person to
terminate employment. 20 Justice Cappy concluded that the
although the termination decision was made by the employee, it was involuntary because it
was compelled by forces beyond the worker's control. Id.
14. Allegheny Valley, 697 A-2d at 247. The supreme court expressly overruled Old Forge
Bank v. Unemployment Compensation Bd., 666 A.2d 761 (Pa. Conunw. Ct. 1995). The
supreme court held that if an employee is demoted for legitimate business reason, voluntary
termination of his employment will make him ineligible for unemployment compensation. Id.
at 766. Conversely, if an employee is unjustly demoted, he is entitled to compensation.
Unemployment Compensation Bd. v. Tune, 350 A.2d. 876 (Pa 1976).
15. Allegheny Valley, 697 A.2d at 247-48. The court reiterated the policy behind the
enactment of section 802, providing economic maintenance to those who are unemployed
through no fault of their own. The court stated that if an employee's demotion was justified,
he has neither a necessitous nor compelling reason for terminating his employment since the
change of job responsibility and reduction of salary were his own fault. Id.
16. Id. (citing Southeastern Pa. Trans. Auth. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd., 531
A.2d 60 (Pa Commw. Ct. 1976), overruled by Old Forge Bank v. Unemployment
Compensation Bd., 666 A.2d 761 (Pa Commw. Ct. 1995), overruled by Allegheny Valley
School v. Unemployment Compensation Bd., 697 A.2d 243 (Pa. 1997)). An employer can
demote an employee for any valid reason. Id. To require an investigation of any other factor,
aside from justification of demotion, allowing the award of unemployment compensation
would force employers to retain incompetent workers or be liable for benefits. Id.
17. Allegheny Valley, 697 A.2d at 249.
18. Id. (Cappy, J., dissenting). Justice Cappy was joined in dissent by Justice Nigro. Id.
19. Id. Justice Cappy asserted that the prior test applied by the appellate court allowed
an employer to demote an employee, yet still provided the employee who is working to the
best of his ability with economic assurance. Id.
20. Id. at 250. Justice Cappy identified other life factors which may force an employee
to terminate his employment, including legal duties and family obligations. Id. (citing
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majority's policy concerns were without merit because they allowed
unemployment compensation only if an employee can show that his
demotion was unreasonable. Such a decision left no safe haven for
the employee who worked to the best of his ability, but was forced
to terminate his employment because of circumstances beyond his
21
control.
The United States' Unemployment Compensation Act originated
in English social welfare legislation.22 Using the British insurance
model, the United States Social Security Administration published
selected portions of England's unemployment insurance act that
served as a basis for the American compensation plan. 23 Congress'
enactment of the Unemployment Compensation Act in 1935
induced the states to do the same. 4 Pennsylvania adopted a system
of unemployment compensation in 1937.25 The Pennsylvania
legislature enacted the Unemployment Compensation Act to
combat the indigence that falls on the unemployed worker. 26 The
legislature believed that the most efficient way to guard against this
threatened poverty was to set aside financial reserves to provide
economic sustenance to those who became unemployed through no
fault of their own. 27 The concept of "no fault" was stressed further
Philadelphia Parking Authority v. Unemployment Compensation Bd., 654 A-2d 280 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1995)). The dissent asserted that in deciding whether an employee has a
necessitous and compelling reason for terminating his employment, a court must examine
the impact of the pressuring situation upon the employee. Id. at 282.
21. Allegheny Valley, 697 A.2d at 251. Justice Cappy rejected the majority's holding that
looking into factors beyond justification for demotion will cause employers to retain
incompetent workers for fear of being subject to claims for unemployment. Id. The dissent
countered the majority's policy argument by noting that an employee who is justifiably
demoted has never been able to retain benefits, and employers have always had the option
of terminating incompetent workers. Id.
22. Bliley Electric Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd., 45 A.2d 898 (Pa. 1946).
England was the first common law country to develop unemployment compensation
insurance as a form of social obligation to employees. Id. at 901.
23. Id. at 901 n.1. In 1938, the Social Security Administration published Benefit
Decisions of the British Empire: A Codification and Text of Selected Decisions. The volume
contains 759 decisions by the Umpire under the British unemployment insurance acts. They
were selected with special reference to the problems created by the provisions in the various
American acts, and have provided the foundation for much of the administrative law on the
subject. Id.
24. Id. at 901.
25. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 751 (1991 & West Supp. 1998).
26. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 752 (1991 & West Supp. 1998). The Unemployment
Compensation Act was created to promote the general welfare of the citizens of the
Commonwealth. Id. It was the widely held belief that economic insecurity due to
unemployment bred indigency, and providing economic sustenance to those involuntarily
unemployed would combat this destitution. Id.
27. Id.
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in the act's comment on the ineligibility of one who has voluntarily
28
terminated employment to collect compensation.
In the 1938 case of Department of Labor and Indus. v.
Unemployment Compensation Bd.,29 the court addressed the
meaning of "voluntary termination," which renders a claimant
ineligible for benefits.30 The court held that the word "voluntarily"
refers to leaving work through one's own motion - not through
discharge or dismissal.3 ' The court further noted that a "voluntary
act" is the antithesis of one forced upon the employee by
extraneous factors. 32 In determining whether benefits should be
awarded, the court stated that compensation should be withheld
only when the cause of leaving employment cannot be attributed to
reasonable objective factorsY.'
In 1942, the legislature revisited section 802(b) of the
Unemployment Compensation Act, and codified the notion that one
who voluntarily terminates his employment can only receive
benefits upon a showing of good cause.34 The phrase "good cause"
was interpreted by the supreme court, in 1946, in Bliley Elec. Co. v.
Unemployment Compensation Bd.35 In addressing the issue of
whether a married woman's desire to leave work and tend to her
ailing husband constituted a valid reason for terminating
employment, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania defined the
meaning of "good cause" in the statute.36 The court determined that
"when the pressure of real, not imaginary, substantial, not trifling,
28.

43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN., § 802(b) (1991 & West Supp. 1998).

29. 3 A.2d 211 (Pa Super. Ct. 1938).
30. Department of Labor and Indus., 3 A-2d at 211. Elbert Elmer terminated his
employment after advice from his doctor that his position delivering milk aggravated a
rheumatic condition. Id. at 214. In a companion case, John Priest terminated his employment
after being laid off. Id. at 215.
31. Id. at 213. The court noted that the statute was designed to address those actions,
not due to conduct on part of the employer, which sever the employment relation. Id.
32. Id. at 214. The court noted that any act or disturbing cause which would force one
to terminate his employment is involuntary and does not affect entitlement to benefits. Id.
33. Id. In awarding Elmer benefits, the court held that the influences forcing the
claimant to quit his job were not completely subjective. Id.
34. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN., § 802(b) (1991 & West Supp. 1998).
35. 45 A.2d 898 (Pa. 1946). Claimant took a leave of absence to visit her husband in the
armed forces in South Carolina. Id. She then notified her employer that she wished to
remain in South Carolina since her husband had been hospitalized. Id. Upon her return, the
claimant was assigned to lighter work because of her pregnancy; she subsequently
terminated her employment. Id.
36. Bliley, 45 A-2d 898 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1946). The court noted that the concepts of
willfulness and intention are associated with voluntariness, but the simple fact that one wills
termination does not mean that his leaving was voluntary. Id.
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reasonable, not whimsical, circumstances compel the decision to
leave employment, the decision is voluntary in the sense that the
worker has willed it, but involuntary because outward pressures
have compelled it."37 In conclusion, the court stated that in
determining "good cause," one must look at the factors surrounding
the termination. Pressures such as necessity, family obligations,
and legal duties clearly justify an employee's termination. 8 The
Bliley court held that because the claimant left employment to care
for her sick husband, she had "good cause" for terminating and,
39
therefore, was entitled to benefits.
In 1955, the legislature again amended section 802(b); this
amendment sustituted "a cause of a necessitous and compelling
nature" for "good cause." 40 The enactment of the 1955 amendment
allowed Pennsylvania courts to exercise discretion in creating a
4
reasonable definition of "necessary and compelling good cause." '
In Erie Forge and Steel Corp. v. Unemployment Compensation
Bd.,42 the court examined whether an employee who refuses work
because he believes that the transfer offered him is not
commensurate with his skills or earning capacity has a necessitous
and compelling reason for terminating his employment." Before
answering this question, the court examined the essence of "a
necessitous and compelling good cause."" The superior court held
that to be classified as "good cause," an employee's conduct must
meet the reasonable person standards of ordinary common sense
and prudence. 45 The court also held that a commendable motive for
37. Id. at 903.
38. Id. The superior court recognized that certain extraneous factors, such as personal
and legal obligations may transform voluntary action into involuntary unemployment. Id.
39. Id. "But in the circumstances she was obliged to make the decision, and her
surrender to the compulsion of her legal obligations provided the good cause which justified
the voluntary relinquishment of her employment." Id.
40. 43 PA CONS. STAT. ANN. § 802(b) (1991 & West Supp. 1998).
41. Id.
42. 115 A.2d 791 (Pa- Super. Ct. 1955), overruled on other grounds by Shay v.
Unemployment Compensation Bd., 227 A_2d 174 (Pa. 1967).
43. Erie Forge, 115 A.2d at 792-93. The facts showed that the claimant was employed
as a bricklayer. Id. However, due to a lack of work for bricklayers, the claimant was
temporarily transferred to the labor department. Id. The claimant refused the transfer,
terminated his employment, and sought unemployment benefits. Id.
44. Id. at 794. (citing Homing Unemployment Compensation Case, 112 A.2d 405 (Pa.
1955)). Generally, an employee who is out of work through his own action is beyond the
reach of the Unemployment Compensation Act. Horning, 112 A.2d at 406. Yet, this general
rule is qualified since an employee who left his employment may be entitled to benefits if his
termination was prompted by good cause. Id.
45. Erie Forge, 115 A.2d at 794.
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leaving employment is not necessarily a "good cause."46 Applying
this definition, the court held that a refusal to accept a profitable
transfer does not make one "involuntarily unemployed" as defined
47
in the act.
In the later case of Wojciechowski v. Unemployment
Compensation Bd.,48 the court addressed the similar issue of
whether an assembler who refused work on a riveting machine had
a necessitous and compelling cause for ending employment. 49 The
court held that to have a necessitous and compelling reason for
terminating employment, certain requirements must be satisfied. 50
First, the decision to terminate employment must rest on good faith
and evince a sincere desire to work and be self-sufficient. 51 Second,
one must always be willing to accept proffered work and must
have sound and reasonable grounds for refusing employment. 52 In
Wojciechowski, the court found that because the claimant refused
to try work on the riveting machine, she did not show a sincere
desire to be self-sufficient; thus, the termination of her employment
did not rest on good faith, and she was not entitled to collect
compensation.53
After addressing the general requirements of a necessitous and
compelling cause, the court, in Fegely v. Unemployment
Compensation Bd.,5 sought to discover whether circumstances,
46. Id. (citing Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd.,
56 A.2d 254, 258 (Pa. 1948) (holding that "a laudable motive for leaving employment and a
good cause within the meaning of the Act are entirely different things.").
47. Id., 115 A.2d at 793. The court recognized that the claimant had an absolute right
to terminate his employment; however, the transfer did not constitute a cause which would
compel a reasonable person to terminate his employment. Id. Therefore, because the
claimant had no good cause for terminating his employment, he had not achieved the status
of unemployment within the purview of the statute. Id.
48. 142 A.2d 756 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1958).
49. Wojciechowski, 142 A.2d at 757. Mary Wojciechowski was employed as a toy
assembler by American Metal Specialties. Id. Because of insufficient assembly work at
American Metal, Wojciechowski was referred to the Kemline Manufacturing Company, where
she was offered work on a riveting machine. Id. Wojciechowski refused the position and
filed for unemployment in accordance with section 802(b). Id.
50. Id. at 758.
51. Id. "There can be no 'good cause' which does not rest on good faith. Good faith in
this context, embraces not only the merely negative virtue of freedom from fraud but also
positive conduct which is consistent with a genuine desire to work and to be
self-supporting." Id.
52. Id. "A claimant who seeks benefits must at all times be ready and willing to accept
suitable employment from the employment office or any employer, and must have
substantive and reasonable grounds for refusing offered work." Id.
53. Id.
54. 159 A.2d 574 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1960).
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such as demotion, qualify as necessitous and compelling reasons
for employment termination.5 Relying on precedent,5 the court
held that a refusal to accept suitable work offered by the same
employer does not constitute a necessitous and compelling reason
for termination.17 The court also explicitly stated that the
legislature designed the Unemployment Compensation Act to apply
to those persons who refuse proffered work after being
involuntarily unemployed, as opposed to those who are gainfully
employed and terminate their employment because of mere
dissatisfaction with the job tendered. 58 The court concluded that
because the claimant refused suitable work offered by his current
employer, his case did not fall within the scope of the
Unemployment Compensation Act, and he was not entitled to
59
collect compensation.
In Unemployment Compensation Bd. v. Tune,60 the court
addressed whether a justified demotion constitutes a necessitous
and compelling reason for terminating one's employment.61 The
court reiterated the well-settled principle that for a cause to be
necessitous and compelling, it must be substantial, real, and
reasonable, not imaginary or trifling.6 2 The court also stated that a
55. Fegely, 159 A2d at 575. Fegely was employed by the Westinghouse Electric
Company. Id. Due to a seniority provision reached in the collective bargaining process
between his employer and the union, Fegely could avoid being laid off by accepting a
transfer to a job as a machinist's helper. Id. Fegely refused this offer because he preferred to
stay in his classification as a burner. Id.
56. Id. at 575. The court cited Erie Forge and Steel Co. v. Unemployment
Compensation Bd., 115 A.2d 791 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1955). See supra notes 42-47 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Erie Forge.
57. Fegely, 159 A2d at 575 (citing Erie Forge and Steel Corp. v. Unemployment
Compensation Bd., 115 A.2d 791 (Pa. 1955)). In Erie Forge, the court stated that one who
voluntarily terminates his employment instead of accepting work that is within his
capabilities has failed to meet the necessitous and compelling standard for termination. Erie
Forge, 115 A.2d at 794.
58. Fegety, 159 A.2d at 576 (citing Erie Forge and Steel Corp. v. Unemployment Bd.,
115 A.2d 791, 793 (Pa. 1955)).
59. Id. at 575-76. The court noted that the burden of proving a necessitous and
compelling cause is on the employee. Id. Because the only testimony offered was that of the
employee who refused the position as a machinist's helper because he wished to retain his
classification as a burner, the court found that the employee failed to show a necessitous
and compelling reason for termination. Id.
60. 350 A.2d 876 (Pa. Comnw. Ct. 1976).
61. Tune, 350 A.2d at 877. Claimant was employed as the Assistant Director of Security.
Id. During work, an altercation over a gambling debt developed between the claimant and
another employee. Id. Both employees were suspended and subsequently demoted. Id. After
serving the suspension, the claimant was asked to return to work as a Security Supervisor,
he refused and terminated his employment. Id.
62. Id. at 877. The court recited the holding of U.S. Steel Corp. v. Unemployment
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"justified demotion" is one that the employee brings upon himself.63
The court viewed the termination of employment by one who is to
blame for his own demotion as equivalent to refusing employment
because of mere dissatisfaction with working status - he who
voluntarily terminates employment merely because of job
dissatisfaction is not entitled to compensation.64 The Thne court
determined that the claimant brought his demotion upon himself
and, therefore, did not qualify for benefits. 65
In 1987, the supreme court, in Southeastern Pa. Trans. Auth. v.
Unemployment Compensation Bd.,66 considered whether an
unjustified demotion constitutes a necessitous and compelling
cause, thus allowing one to terminate her employment and earn
unemployment benefits.67 The court explored whether voluntary
termination because of the employee's discontent with a demoted
position is a compelling cause, finding that the answer turns on the
justification of that demotion. 68 The court also noted that in certain
circumstances, one who is placed in an unsuitable position has a
necessitous and compelling reason to quit his employment
voluntarily.69 In its holding, the court further stated, that although
an employee must be willing to accept reasonable changes in job
assignment, a change created by an unjust demotion is not
reasonable and, therefore, constitutes a necessitous and compelling
cause within the purview of Section 802(b) of the Unemployment
Compensation Bd., 333 A.2d 807 (Pa. Commuw. Ct. 1975).
63. Tune, 350 A.2d at 877.
64. Id.
65. Id. The court found that the claimant's participation in an altercation over a
gambling debt justified his demotion. Id. The court affirmed the decision of the Board
denying benefits because the claimant failed to sustain his burden of showing a necessitous
and compelling reason for employment termination. Id.
66. 531 A.2d 60 (Pa. Conunw. Ct. 1987).
67. Southeastern, 531 A.2d at 60. Claimant was employed as a Transportation Systems
Specialist Complex. Id. The claimant was demoted when a new supervisor expressed
dissatisfaction with his performance. Id. The facts showed that the claimant had a Bachelor's
Degree in Science and Mechanical Engineering, and that he had been employed in the
engineering field for over twenty-five years. Id. The position offered to the claimant upon
demotion required only minimal skill and had been previously held by a bus driver with no
engineering experience. Id. After several requests for removal from the position, claimant
terminated his employment. Id.
68. Id. at 63. (citing Frankford Hospital v. Unemployment Compensation B, 445 A-2d
256 (Pa. Comnw. Ct 1982)). The issue addressed in Frankford Hospital was whether an
unjustified demotion which causes an employee to terminate his employment constitutes a
necessitous and compelling cause, thus allowing the employee to collect unemployment
compensation. Id.
69. Id. at 62 (citing Shay v. Unemployment Compensation Bd., 227 A.2d 174 (Pa.
1967)).
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Compensation Act. 70 The court remanded to determine whether the
claimant's demotion was justified, for only an unwarranted
demotion entitles an employee to benefits.7
In the recent landmark case of Old Forge Bank v. Unemployment
Compensation Bd.,72 the court revisited the issue of whether a
justified demotion serves as an absolute bar to a voluntarily
unemployed worker's right to collect unemployment
compensation. 73 The court held that simply because some discipline
may be authorized, employers do not have an unrestrained right to
use irrational disciplinary measures against their employees.74
Moreover, the court noted that, in investigating claims for
unemployment compensation when the employee voluntarily
75
terminates his employment, a court must focus on two inquiries.
Initially, the court must focus on the justification of the disciplinary
measure. 76 If the court establishes that the discipline is warranted,
the employer must show that the action taken was reasonable; if
not, the court will deem the punishment excessive, allowing an
employee to terminate his position and collect benefits. 77 The court
reasoned that the new two-step inquiry furthers the purpose
underlying the Unemployment Compensation Act because the
process defers to those circumstances that may justify employer
70. Id. at 63. The court relied on the Frankford and Tune decisions in reaching its
decision. Id..
71. Id. at 63-64. The court refused to infer justifiability from the previous findings of
fact. Id. The court noted that, on one hand it was possible for an engineer with twenty-five
years experience to allow his performance to deteriorate, yet in the alternative, it was also
possible that the new supervisor merely wanted to replace the claimant with someone more
familiar to the supervisor. Id.
72. 666 A.2d 761 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995).
73. Old Forge, 666 A.2d at 763. The facts showed that claimant had a history of
absenteeism. Id. at 762. As a result of her constant absences, claimant's employer requested
medical certification documenting an alleged disability which prevented the claimant from
reporting to work as scheduled. Id. at 763. The claimant presented a note from her doctor
stating that she had been treated for migraine headaches, but the note was devoid of any
statement that such headaches prevented her from attending work. Id. Employer demoted
the claimant to part-time to allow her to correct her medical condition. Id.
74. Id. at 765. The court reasoned, "While the correlative principle is certainly true,
that an unjustified demotion in job position, or reduction in pay will provide good cause for
a voluntary termination, simply because some discipline may be justified and warranted does
not provide employers with an unbridled leave to take unreasonable disciplinary measures
against its employees." Id.
75. Id. at 767.
76. Id.
77. Id. The court stated that a "unilateral, substantial, unjustified, or unreasonable
change in terms and conditions of employment" will constitute a necessitous and compelling
good cause under section 802(b). Id.
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chastisement, but the employee is not subjected to egregious forms
of punishment. 78 The court held that the reduction in pay that
accompanied a demotion to part-time status, was unreasonable and
the claimant had a necessitous
and compelling reason for
79
employment.
her
terminating
Following Old Forge, an employee justifiably demoted by
management may still have a necessitous and compelling reason for
terminating employment upon a showing of unreasonable
punishment imposed by the employer80 This decision remained in
effect until the Allegheny Valley court expressly overruled Old
Forge in favor of the previous rule that a justified demotion serves
as a complete bar to compensation.8 '
The express public policy underlying the Unemployment
Compensation Act and the Allegheny Valley decision was
correction of the economic insecurity that accompanies
unemployment. The key inquiry behind every court decision in
which unemployment compensation is the core issue is whether the
82
claimant was unemployed through no fault of his own.
After Allegheny Valley, any person who is justifiably demoted
cannot collect compensation. The decision fails to recognize other
life factors which may force an employee to terminate his
employment. Moreover, the analysis by the supreme court, focusing
solely on the justifiability of demotion, does not protect the
employee who is working to the best of his ability but is still
demoted. As noted by the dissent, the analytical framework chosen
by the court allows employers to demote any employee, yet fails to
provide employees with any form of restitution.83
78. Old Forge, 666 A.2d at 766. The court noted that an employer still has the absolute
right to terminate an employee upon a finding of willful misconduct. Id. However, the
employee who is working to the best of his ability, and is forced to terminate his
employment because of circumstances beyond his control, now has a safe haven under
which he can voluntarily quit his job and still obtain economic relief provided by the act. Id.
79. Id. at 767.
80. Id.
81. Allegheny VaUey, 697 A.2d at 248. The court stated, "We therefore, reject the
current reasoning of the commonwealth court in Old Forge, because it is not an accurate
statement of the law. Instead, we adopt the Tune line of cases that if a claimant refuses to

accept a justified demotion and voluntarily quits, the claimant is ineligible for benefits under
Section 802(b)." Id.
82. Id. at 247-48. The Act was designed to provide financial sustenance to those who
were involuntarily unemployed or idle through no fault of their own. Id.
83. Id. at 249. Justice Cappy noted that in rejecting the comprehensive approach
employed by the Commonwealth Court, the court places the employee who is demoted, even
though he is working to the best of his ability, in severe danger of being forced to leave his
position without remuneration. Id. at 249-50.
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The supreme court's approach may be too narrow to adequately
enforce the policy behind the Unemployment Compensation Act.
Observation of the demoted employee's interest suggests two flaws
in the majority's opinion. First, the focus on justification for
demotion negates the impact of other circumstances that may force
an employee to quit his job. That is, the majority's opinion will
have a crippling effect on those justifiably demoted employees who
are forced to accept such a severe decrease in wages that they can
no longer support their families. These employees must either
4
accept the demotion or quit and receive no unemployment relief.8
Second, the single element test, applied by the majority, allows an
unethical employer to avoid paying unemployment compensation
benefits by demoting the employee. Such an employer may demote
the employee to a position substantially lower than his or her
qualifications merit. Again, the court's opinion forces the employee
to accept the position or terminate employment, thus making him
ineligible for benefits. This method allows the employer to use
demotion as a way to circumvent the purpose of the statute.
On the surface, it is fairly easy to agree with the court's
rationale, for it seems logical that an employee not working to full
potential, who is subsequently demoted, should not be entitled to
benefits when he terminates his employment because of
displeasure with the demoted position that he brought upon
himself. Further investigation reveals, however, that a more just
rule may lie in an analysis that permits examination of the effect of
the demotion upon the employee. Through the rule set forth in
Allegheny Valley, a claimant must select the lesser of two evils, for
this decision forces these claimants to either blindly accept
demotion or terminate employment and lose their chance to collect
unemployment compensation.
ChristineM. Gass

84. Id. The dissent stressed the importance of focusing on the impact of the demotion
on the respective employee. Id.
85. Allegheny VaUey, 697 A.2d at 250. The dissent reasoned that an employer who
demotes an employee to a position of significantly less pay has "constructively discharged"
that employee. Id. Therefore, affirmation of the rule set forth in Tune fails to account for
those situations where the employer uses unreasonable demotion as a form of discipline. Id.

